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Abstract
This article outlines the ongoing troubles of Intel Corporation in the European Union in relation to
their accused violations of antitrust competition laws, set forth in Article 82 of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community. The article then turns its focus to Intel's current status as a com-
pany in a "dominant position," as defined by the European Commission, and the rights and
obligations that are associated with this. Additionally, the article addresses the European Commis-
sion's recent filing of a "Statement of Objections" - which states their belief in Intel's abuse of their
dominant position in excluding their main rival, AMD, from the computer chip market. Finally,
the article addresses the corresponding legal battle, possible ensuing penalties that may be levied
against Intel, and the precedent set forth by the European Commission's battle with Microsoft.
Antitrust issues in the European Union ("EU") are covered by the European Commis-
sion ("EC"), which is the EU's competition law enforcement agency and is "one of five
major institutions intended to advance the goals of the EU."1 In relation to the United
States enforcement groups on antitrust issues, the EC can be compared to the "Antitrust
Division, Federal Trade Commission ('FTC'), and state attorney general all wrapped into
one."2 However, "in many ways, EU antitrust powers are lacking when compared to
those of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission."3 There are addi-
tional differences in the way the United States ("U.S") deals with antitrust competition,
"[s]pecifically the goal of U.S. antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare, while
the EC protects competition by protecting competitors."4 "'European authorities and
courts put a higher duty on dominant firms to deal fairly with their competitors,' says
Philip Marsden, a senior research fellow at the British Institute of International & Com-
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1. Jeffrey M. Peterson, Unrest in the European Commission: The Changing Landscape and Politics of lnterna-
tional Mergers for United States Companies, 24 Hous. J. IsI' L. 377, 381-84 (2002).
2. Robert E. Draba, InternationalAntitrust: Supreme Court Derides the Meaning of"Gives Rise to a Claim"and
"Foreign Tribunal", 2 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 129, 138 (2004).
3. Peterson, supra note 1, at 400.
4. Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CAIDozo L. REv. 287, 295-
96 (2002) (footnote omitted).
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parative Law. 'They want to foster gentlemanly competition, a premise that is foreign to
American antitrust thinking."' 5
The EU protects this competition under Article 82 ("Article 82") of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community ("Treaty").6 Article 82 states, "any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial
part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market."7 The European
Court of First Instance stated:
An abuse is an "objective concept referring to the behavior of an undertaking in a
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a
result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition
is already weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those
governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions
of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition. s
For a violation to be brought under Article 82, the following elements must occur: (1)"a
dominant position in a relevant product and geographic market within the common mar-
ket;" (2) "an abusive act; and" (3) "a potential appreciable effect on trade between Member
States."9 A dominant position is based on the product at issue and what geographic mar-
kets it has available to it.1° "[T]he relevant product market is deemed to include all prod-
ucts that are interchangeable with the product in question. The relevant geographic
market comprises 'an area where the objective conditions of competition must be the same
for all traders,' and will normally be a single Member State, a group of Member States, or
the whole of the European Union."" The court in the Michelin case held that "[flor the
purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is sufficient to show that the
abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition
or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having that effect.cdq; 12 Article 82 does
not state what makes a company dominant, or what percentage of the market share they
5. Jennifer L. Schenker, Intel's in Hot Water, Sept. 21, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/
contentsep2007/gb2O07O921-968706.htmchan=top+news-top+news+index-businessweek+exclusives (last
visited Sept. 13, 2008). Compare this with the premise established in the United States in Verizon Comm'ns
v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (stating "the mere possession of monopoly
power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element
of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct").
6. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 349) 3, art. 82. A consoli-
dated version of this treaty can be found at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htIn/
C_2002325EN.003301.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
7. Id.
8. Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission, 2003 ECR 11-4071
9. James S. Venit, EU Competition Law-Enforcement and Compliance: An Overview, 65 ANmITRUsT L.J. 81,
83-84 (1996) (discussing Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which is now Article 82).
10. Id. at 84.
11. Id.
12. Michelin, snpra note 8, at 239
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must have to be considered dominant.' 3 A company with a market share of 50 percent or
more, however, will be presumed to be dominant.' 4 Indeed, "dominance may be found
with market shares between 40 or 50 percent, or even lower."' 5 If a company has a domi-
nant position there is "a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competi-
tion on the common market."' 6
Article 82 lays out a few examples of such market abuse, and as such prohibits the
following: imposing unfair purchase or selling prices, limiting production or market/tech-
nical developments to the prejudice of consumers, discriminating against trading parties
("applying dissimilar conditions on equivalent transactions"), and imposing additional, un-
related contractual terms to acceptance of the contract when they have no connection or
basis with the contract.' 7 Note that this list is not all inclusive and does not rule out other
types of market abuse.
The EC has relied heavily on Article 82 to protect competition in the marketplace when
dealing with abusive conduct by companies. EC Commissioner Neelie Kroes has made
sure of that, pledging:
I will rigorously enforce the Treaty's prohibition on abusive conduct. Dominant
companies should be allowed to compete effectively. Putting this policy objective
into a consistent legal and economic framework is an ambitious project, but it is
worthwhile for the clarity it will give to companies and their advisers. Our funda-
mental aim is to ensure that the EU's powers to intervene against monopoly abuses
are applied consistently and effectively, not only by the Commission but also by na-
tional competition agencies and courts throughout the EU which also now apply EU
competition law. 18
When the EC finds that an Article 82 violation has occurred, it will conduct its investiga-
tion and upon a finding that a formal inquiry is needed, will issue a "Statement of Objec-
tions." The European Commission has clarified that "[a] Statement of Objections is a
formal step in Commission antitrust investigations in which the Commission informs the
parties concerned in writing of the objections raised against them. The addressee of a
Statement of Objections can reply in writing [or request a hearing] to the Statement of
Objections, setting out all facts known to it which are relevant to its defense against the
objections raised by the Commission.' 9
Intel is a company incorporated in the United States, and its products include chips,
boards, and other semiconductor products that are the building blocks integral to com-
13. Stefan Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and the Question of the Goals of
Antitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT"L ECON. L. 595 (2002).
14. Venit, supra note 9, at 86.
15. Id., at 84. , Case T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. H-5917(stating that a market
position of thirty-nine percent was a dominant market position).
16. Michelin, supra note 8, at 230.
17. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, supra note 6.
18. European Commission Competition Statement: Article 82 Review, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
comil/competition/antitrustlart82/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
19. Press Release, European Commission Competition Committee, Competition: Commission Confirms
Sending of Statement of Objections to Intel, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/07/314&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Sept. 13,
2008) [hereinafter ECCC Press Release].
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puters, servers, handheld devices, and networking and communications products. 20 Intel's
main, if not only, competitor in the field of semiconductor products is Advanced Micro
Devices ("AMD"). AMD feels that:
Intel has bullied its customers-particularly PC manufacturers-through financial
threats and intimidation into entering exclusive deals, conditioning rebates on avoid-
ance of AMD products and with threats of retaliation. These PC manufacturers now
operate on small or negative margins, making them continually susceptible to Intel's
economic coercion; and Intel perpetuates its hold over them to the detriment of cus-
tomers and consumers who are unable to select AMD products. Intel then exacer-
bates PC manufacturers' financial weakness by charging monopoly prices. This
trickles down to consumers, who are forced to pay monopoly prices while at the same
time they are denied the freedom to choose from a full range of products.21
Apparently the EC agrees. The EC sent a Statement of Objections to Intel on July 26,
2007 regarding antitrust issues with AMD. The EC confirmed that the "Statement of
Objections outlines the Commission's preliminary view that Intel has infringed the EC
Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant position (Article 82) with the aim of excluding its
main rival, AMD, from the x86 Computer Processing Units (CPU) market. '22 The CPU
market at issue is a market in which "Intel is alleged to hold worldwide market share
measured as 80 [percent] of the market in units and 90 [percent] of the market in reve-
nues.[FN 23] This market share clearly meets the dominant market position required to be
at issue under Article 82. In the Statement of Objections, the EC has accused Intel of the
following:
First, Intel has provided substantial rebates to various Original Equipment Manufac-
turers (OEMs) conditional on them obtaining all or the great majority of their CPU
requirements from Intel. Secondly, in a number of instances, Intel made payments in
order to induce an OEM to either delay or cancel the launch of a product line incor-
porating an AMD-based CPU. Thirdly, in the context of bids against AMD-based
products for strategic customers in the server segment of the market, Intel has offered
CPUs on average below cost. 24]
The EC has stated that "these three types of conduct are aimed at excluding AMD from
the market. Each of them is provisionally considered to constitute an abuse of a dominant
position in its own right. '25 It should additionally be noted that the EC is also "considers
that the three types of conduct could reinforce each other" and as such be "part of a single
anti-competitive strategy."26
In response to the EC decision to issue the Statement of Obligations to Intel, Intel's
General Counsel stated:
20. Intel company description is available at www.intel.com.
21. News Release, AMD, Demand Fair and Open Competition, available at http://www.amd.com/us-en/
Weblets/0,,7832-12670 13443,00.htnl (last visited Sept. 13, 2008).
22. ECCC Press Release, supra note 19.
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We are confident that the microprocessor market segment is functioning normally
and that Intel's conduct has been lawful, pro-competitive, and beneficial to consum-
ers. While we would certainly have preferred to avoid the cost and inconvenience of
establishing that our competitive conduct in Europe has been lawful, the Commis-
sion's decision to issue a Statement of Objections means that at last Intel will have the
opportunity to hear and respond to the allegations made by our primary competitor.
The case is based on complaints from a direct competitor rather than customers or
consumers. The Commission has an obligation to investigate those complaints.
However, a Statement of Objections contains only preliminary allegations and does
not itself amount to a finding that there has been a violation of European Union law.
Intel will now be given the chance to respond directly to the Commission's concerns
as part of the administrative process. The evidence that this industry is fiercely com-
petitive and working is compelling. When competitors perform and execute the mar-
ket rewards them. When they falter and under-perform the market responds
accordingly.2
7
AMD has applauded the issuance of the Statement of Objections, stating that
"[c]onsumers know today that their welfare has been sacrificed in the illegal interest of
preserving monopoly profits.... The EU action obviously suggests that Intel has, once
again, been unable to justify its illegal conduct." 28 Intel has pointed out that receiving a
Statement of Obligations is a far cry from being found guilty of anticompetitive
behavior.29
While a true statement, this is likely the beginning of a long and expensive legal bat-
tle-just ask Microsoft. Microsoft was the target of an EC antitrust investigation in 2004
on this same issue-abuse of a dominant market position. 30 The Microsoft decision dealt
with Microsoft being fined C497 million ($686 million) "for infringing the EC Treaty
rules on abuse of a dominant market position (Article 82) by leveraging its near monopoly
in the market for PC operating systems onto the markets for work group server operating
systems and for media players" resulting in conduct that hindered innovation in the mar-
kets to the detriment of consumers. 31 Microsoft challenged the imposition of such a sub-
stantial fine, but the EU Court of First Instance upheld the fine.3 2 When a company is
found guilty of abusing a dominant market position in violation of Article 82, the remedy
is the imposition of substantial fines. 33
27. News Release, Intel, Intel States its Actions in Europe Benefit Customers (July 7, 2007), available at
htep://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20070727corp.htmiid=prl-releasepri-2 0 0 7072 7 r (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2007).
28. Press Release, AMD, European Commission (EC) Charges Intel with Antitrust Violations (uly 27,
2007), available at http://www.amd.com/us-en/Corporate/VirtualPressRoom/0,,51-104_543-l18586,00.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2008).
29. Intel News Release, supra note 27.
30. Press Release, European Commission Antitrust Committee, Commission Welcomes CFI Ruling Up-
holding Commission's Decision on Microsoft's Abuse of Dominant Market Position (Sept. 17, 2007), availa-
bit at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/359&format=HTML&aged=&




33. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, supra note 6.
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The EC has stated that fines are "of utmost importance in deterring companies from
breaking [antitrust] competition rules." 34 Under the guidelines set forth, for each in-
fringement the basis amount of the fine is to be "based on a percentage of its yearly sales
of the product relating to the infringement, in the geographic area concerned, and may be
up to 30 [percent] of the relevant sales .... [i]n the case of repeat offenders, the EC may
increase the fines by up to 100 [percent]," with each prior being used as justification.35
Fines however, are not the only enforcement option available-treaty rules allow for in-
junctive relief, as well as damages.36
Damages can serve several purposes in antitrust law, mainly to compensate those who
have suffered a loss as a result of the infringing anti-competitive behavior and to be used
as a deterrent, thus contributing to maintenance of effective competition in the market-
place. 37 Current EC Commissioner Neelie Kroes has found damages to be the right re-
sult, stating "businesses and consumers in Europe have a right to damages if they have lost
out as a result of the anti-competitive behavior of others" 38 The Courts have agreed. The
Court of Justice of the European Communities has found that "effective protection of the
rights granted by the Treaty requires that individuals who have suffered a loss arising from
an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 have the right to claim damages. ' 39 Most recently, in
the Microsoft case, the EC had its powers to fix fines and payments challenged. The EC
responded by imposing an additional definitive penalty payment of C2 80 million for non-
compliance of the 2004 antitrust competition decision, a decision which was upheld by the
European Court of First Instances (the "Court of First Instances"). 40
With the Court of First Instances ruling supporting their findings, the EC could have a
newfound confidence in dealing with Intel. As stated earlier, the EC has reserved the
right to impose heavier fines and penalties when a company has repeat offenses. The
Court of First Instances has stood behind the EC, stating:
[T]he fact that in the past the Commission imposed fines of a particular level for
certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level,
within the limits set out in Regulation No 17 and in the Guidelines, if that is neces-
sary in order to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy."41
Intel is a company that has repeat offenses. It has found itself repeatedly in the crosshairs
of antitrust enforcement proceedings. AMD has filed formal complaints with the EC, as
well as with the respective commissions in Japan, South Korea, and Germany. 42 Most
34. European Union Preparatory Acts, Report from the Commission: Report on Competition Policy EU:
COM (2007) 358 (June 25, 2007) [hereineafter Report on Competition Policy].
35. Id.
36. Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, EU: COM
(2005) 672.
37. Id.
38. Commissioner Neelie Kroes, European Commission Competition Statement, Actions for Damages,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2007).
39. Id.
40. See Report on Competition Policy, supra note 34. See also Commission Welcomes CTF Ruling, supra
note 30.
41. Michelin, supra note 8, at 254.
42. Simon Aughton, Intel Charged with Abuing Market Position by EU, available at http://www.itpro.co.uk/
news/I21225/intel-charged-with-abusing-market-position-by-eu.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
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recently, "South Korea's Fair Trade Commission has completed its two year-long investi-
gation into business practices of Intel, and concluded that the company violated South
Korean antitrust regulations." 43 In particular, the South Korea Fair Trade Commission
"focused on rebates the chipmaker offered to computer manufacturers as a way to steer
them away from products from rival companies like AMD." 44
Additionally, in 2005, Japan found Intel guilty of antitrust practices, stating that "Intel
abused its monopoly power to exclude fair and open competition, violating Section 3 of
Japan's Antimonopoly Act.," a result that Intel did not dispute.45 In that case, Japan's Fair
Trade Commission found that Intel coerced one manufacturer to buy 100 percent of its
CPUs from Intel, while another manufacturer was forced to curtail its non-Intel purchases
to 10 percent or less.46 In Japan, the mechanisms used to achieve these results included
various rebates and marketing practices, including "the 'Intel Inside' program and market
development funds provided through Intel's corporate parent in the United States." 4 7 At
this time, AMD Japan is currently seeking over fifty-five million dollars in damages from
the antitrust issue in Japan alone.4 8 These practices employed by Intel, if found in the EC
case, would also clearly violate Article 82's prohibitions.
This all comes at a time when AMD has filed several pending litigations against Intel.
AMD filed suit in U. S. Federal Court in 2006, alleging the same types of anti-competitive
behavior. In the U. S. case, AMD is again alleging antitrust infringements and monopo-
listic behavior in violation of the Sherman Act, which is the U. S. equivalent to Article 82.
The Sherman Act, in relevant parts, states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
4 9
The difference in the nature and scope of the fines are astounding, as the United States is
far more lenient. Notice that under the U. S. code Intel can only be fined a maximum of
$100 million dollars.5 0 This is relatively small in comparison to the past fines the EC has
shown they can levy, as exemplified by the almost one billion dollars they fined Microsoft.
43. Geoff Duncan, Intel Violated South Korea Antitrust Laws DIGITAL TRENDS, Sept. 11, 2007, available at
http://news.digitaltrends.com/news/story/14146/intel-violated-south-korea-antitrustlaws (last visited Sept.
13, 2008).
44. Id.
45. Press Release, AMD News Room, Tokyo District Court Denies Intel K.K. Argument To Keep Evi-
dence Obtained By JFTC of Illegal Business Practices From The Public Record (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.amd.com/us-en/Corporate/VirtualPressRoorm/O,,51-104_543-103376,00.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2007). See also AiMD Japan K.K. v. Intel K.I, Case No. Hesei 17(Wa) No. 13151 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. June
30, 2005); AMD Japan K.K. v. Intel K.K., Case No. Heisei 17(Wa) No. 4 (Tokyo High CourtJune 30, 2005).
46. AMD Japan K.K., Case No. Heisei 17(Wa) No. 4.
47. Id.
48. The Associated Press, AMD Japan Seeks §55from Intel Japan, available at http://www.amd.com/us-en/
assets/content-type/DownloadableAssets/AP_0605_l.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
49. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
50. Id.
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An economic study issued by Dr. Michael A. Williams, Director, ERS Group, found
that Intel has extracted monopoly profits from microprocessor sales of more than sixty
billion dollars in the period 1996-2006.51 Dr. Williams said, "Intel has extracted $60 bil-
lion in monopoly profits over the past decade; over the next decade consumers and com-
puter manufacturers would save over $80 billion from a fully competitive market."52
Looking at what Article 82 allows for the EC to do in respect to fines, those figures could
lead to a penalty of up to $20 billion dollars. Intel has stated that they look forward to the
EC inquiry and the opportunity to clear itself, but this could turn out to be a very costly
accusation. The EC has shown it can and will protect consumers and foster competi-
tion-just ask Microsoft.
51. Press Release, AMD News Room, New Economic Study Finds Intel Extracted Monopoly Profits of
S60 Billion Since 1996, available at http://www.amd.com/us-enlCorporate/VirtualPressRoom/O,,51_104_543
-118720,00.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
52. Id.
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